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1. VULNERABILITY AND ACCESS TO LOW COST CREDIT 
DR. ORKUN AKSELI  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Access to low cost credit is at the crossroads of contracts, property, company and 
consumer laws. Thus it has many directions which may interact with the concept of 
vulnerability. Access to credit is critical for consumers, small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and large companies. Risks have been revealed through the abusive 
use of financing techniques such as securitisation. This has been coupled with the poor 
perception of the risks involved in innovative techniques of raising finance, including 
failure to properly explain risks to investors. This has led to increasing indebtedness and 
loss of investor confidence. Similar argument applies to consumers whose confidence has 
been affected by irresponsible lending practices that turned the subprime crisis into a 
global financial crisis.  Lack of access to funds reveals susceptibility to loss of business 
for SMEs and lack of access to the housing market for consumers. The Bank of 
England‟s current interest rate (0.5 per cent)1 has not been reflected in the interest rates of 
banks which have kept their interest rates at a higher level and refused to lend to 
businesses.2    
 
In March 2009, the Bank of England, while reducing the interest rate to 0.5%, employed 
a method known as Quantitative Easing („QE‟). Essentially, QE is a monetary policy 
according to which the Bank of England channels credit into the economy and banks to 
help particularly banks to build up their reserves and to lend out borrowers. QE also 
enables the Government to meet the inflation target and avoids stagnation by increasing 
economic activity and growth. During times of financial crisis central banks may 
                                                 
 Durham University Law School, England. 
1
 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ (last accessed 9 March 2010). The current official Bank of England 
interest rate was set on 5 March 2009. It is worth noting that the Bank of England rate is reviewed every 
month.  
2
 P. Moores, „Credit Strike Highlights need for reform‟ Financial Times 15 February 2009. 
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purchase private sector debt to assist corporate credit markets to be relieved.3 This assists 
companies to continue to lend and reduce the cost of credit by giving confidence to 
investors. However, injection of money into the economy has to stop at a certain point in 
order to keep the inflation target, because too much money in the market will trigger high 
inflation.4 
 
This contribution will focus on exploring the meaning of vulnerability in the context of 
SMEs‟ access to credit. It also examines the possible effects of lack of access to finance 
on SMEs. The article intends to offer some various suggestions on financing the SMEs in 
order to overcome difficulties in access to finance through modernisation of law in this 
area. The recurrent theme is that, unlike most large businesses, access to low cost credit is 
critical for SMEs, since financiers and banks only extend credit to SMEs on a secured 
basis thus often apply high interest rates in which they include default risk which 
increases the cost of credit. SMEs that fail to access to low cost credit becomes 
susceptible against creditors and may be prone to insolvency. Inability to access to 
finance constitutes vulnerability for SMEs who need liquidity to expand their operations.    
 
Part two will discuss briefly the background of credit crisis and reasons for lack of access 
to finance. In that context, the article will focus on the reasons for SMEs‟ difficulties in 
access to credit. Part three will explore the definition of vulnerability to the extent it 
interacts with access to low-cost credit. Part four will examine some policy issues and 
                                                 
3
 For a recent example see ‘Quantitative Easing: What is it, will it work and what are the alternatives’ The 
Guardian (7 October 2011) according to which the Federal Reserve purchased mortgage backed securities 
and corporate bonds to ease the flow of credit. .  
4
 For further information on Quantitative Easing see The Bank of England, „Quantitative Easing Explained 
Putting more money in to our economy to boost spending‟ available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/pdf/qe-pamphlet.pdf (last accessed on 10 March 2011). It 
is possible that a third round of QE may be employed. See 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/oct/09/third-round-quanititative-easing-possible (last accessed on 
10 October 2011). In the first week of February 2010, the Bank of England announced that the QE would 
halt as despite injection of critical amount of money into the economy, the inflation rate did not drop below 
2% and the bank lending had not been affected. The Bank of England is right to halt its injection of huge 
sums into the economy, The Times, 5 February 2010. But cf. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/oct/09/third-round-quanititative-easing-possible (last accessed on 
10 October 2011). 
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suggest some solutions drawn from modernisation activities of law of credit and security. 
Conclusions will be in part five. 
 
2. CREDIT CRISIS AND LACK OF ACCESS TO FINANCE 
 
The increased level of lending to borrowers with poor credit histories in the USA can be 
regarded as the starting point of the so-called „credit crunch‟. The credit crisis5 which has 
its roots in the subprime mortgage crisis in the USA has affected lending practices of 
banks after rescues and bail-outs. It is arguable that when the Glass-Steagall Act,6 that 
separated commercial and investment banks, repealed in 1999 by Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (the Financial Modernization Act 1999),7 which allowed the consolidation of 
commercial and investment banks, the working method of investment banks (i.e. 
investment and selling bonds and equities by taking high risk) was introduced to 
commercial high-street banks (which only lend money on a much lower scale than the 
investment banks do). This arguably initiated commercial high street banks to lend under 
risky circumstances. Similar argument equally applies to investment banks and hedge 
funds which assumed debt burdens but were not regulated like high street banks. This 
might have contributed to the global financial crisis.8 Due to lack of meaningful 
                                                 
5
 For a detailed analysis of credit crisis, its relationship to sub-prime mortgage crisis in the USA and 
suggestions for recovery see e.g. S. Schwarcz, „„Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis‟ 60 S. C. L. 
Rev. 549 (2009) pp. 549-572; S. Schwarcz, „Disclosure‟s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis‟ 
American Law and Economics Association Annual Meetings Working Paper no. 18, 2008; O. Bar-Gill, 
„The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts‟ 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1073 (2009) 
pp. 1073-1152. 
6
 This is officially known as The Banking Act of 1933. The Act created the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) in 1933. See also http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/index.html (Last accessed 
11 March 2010). 
7
 See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ102/pdf/PLAW-106publ102.pdf (Last accessed 11 
March 2010). 
8
 For the implications of repealing Glass-Steagall Act and an interesting background and criticism of these 
legislative activities see e.g. J. Stiglitz, „Capitalist Fools‟ Vanity Fair, January 2009. It is important to note 
that recently in the USA the Obama administration has proposed breaking up of banks and limiting their 
overall size and functions (such as prohibiting them to deal with hedge funds, proprietary trade and private 
equity). See R. Peston, „Obama to break up Banks‟ available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2010/01/obama_to_break_up_banks.html (last 
accessed 12 March 2010). Similar arguments equally apply in the UK. The Conservative Party banking 
reform paper also suggests similar solutions. See generally ‘From Crisis to Confidence: Plan for Sound 
Banking‟ Policy White Paper (July 2009). In October 2009, the Bank of England Governor Mervyn King 
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regulation on investment banks and other financial institutions, the necessary capital 
requirements critical to shield the bank against defaults have been avoided. Normally, 
Basel II requirements urge banks to clarify and make transparent their supervision and 
legal structures in order to support credit and security.9 The subprime lending practices, 
which refer to lending to individuals (subprime borrowers)10 who pose credit risk with 
weak or poor credit histories,11 coupled with subprime mortgage securitisations where 
competition among loan originators and among securitisers has played a significant role 
in the lead up to crisis.12 Thus the risk involved in the lending and repayment of these 
borrowed amounts to financial institutions was transferred to investors who purchased 
securitised debts. The crisis which started as a subprime mortgage crisis turned into a 
global financial crisis by the globalised nature of financial markets where investors from 
different countries and markets purchased financial products which were the products of 
securitised subprime mortgages. It could be argued that the credit lent to borrowers with 
poor credit histories was a risky business decision. These were later on securitised as 
mortgage based securities to raise finance for banks. Due to the nature of securitisation,13 
                                                                                                                                                 
also suggested restructuring of banks in addition to regulating them. See also R. Peston, „Bank of England 
backs “spirit of Obama‟s Reforms”‟ available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2010/01/bank_of_england_backs_spirit_o.html (last 
accessed 10 March 2010) 
9
 K. Alexander, „Global Financial Standards Setting, the G10 Committees and International Economic 
Law‟ 34 Brook. J. Int’l L. 861, 865 et seq. (2009). For some criticism and suggestions for reform to 
financial supervision see G. Caprio Jr., A. Demirguc-Kunt and E.J. Kane, „The 2007 Meltdown in 
Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons, Not Scapegoats‟ Policy Research Working Paper 4756 
(2008). It is also interesting to note that the new Basel III standards on liquidity, which require banks to 
hold more liquidity to be more resilient to further credit crises, are being relaxed in order to facilaite 
lending to consumers and businesses. See „Regulators poised to soften new bank rules‟ Financial Times 6 
September 2011. 
10
 In practice, subprime borrowers are those who FICO (Fair Isaac Corporation) scores are below 620. See 
http://www.fico.com/en/Products/Scoring/Pages/FICO-Score.aspx (last accessed 12 March 2010); see also 
Bar-Gill, op cit 5, at 1087.  
11
 As early as 2001, FDIC released extended guidance in relation to subprime lending practices.  The FDIC 
indicated a non-exhaustive list of credit risk characteristics posed by subprime borrowers. These include 
two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 months, judgment, foreclosure or repossession in the last 
24 months, bankruptcy in the last 5 years, relatively high default probability evidenced by credit history 
score and imbalanced debt service-to-income ratio. Available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2001/pr0901a.html  (last accessed 11 March 2010). 
12
 For an interesting discussion see Bar-Gill, op cit 5, 1087 et seq.  
13
 Securitisation is, in fact, a simple method of raising finance based on assignment of receivables expected 
to be generated from future rights to payment. In securitisation receivables are collected, pooled and 
outright assigned to a company (SPV-Special Purpose Vehicle) specially created and bankruptcy remote 
from the assignor. The SPV issues securities or commercial paper to investors which are secured on the 
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there was lack of transparency which may be understood as the lack of information or 
misinformation of investors, who purchased securities from SPVs, of the structure and 
the risks involved in those securities.14 It is arguable that the complex nature of 
securitisation and various mortgage products, which have not been fully understood by 
investors and consumers, set the basis of vulnerability. Unreasonable risk was passed 
through securitisation to investors who were unaware of the risks involved. The decline 
of house prices and the market in the USA and defaults of borrowers with poor credit 
histories in repaying mortgages led to repossession of houses by banks. These risk 
associated elements have been arguably ignored.15 As the right to payment from risky 
borrowers were securitised, thus creating mortgage-based securitisation, upon maturity of 
securities, investors could not be repaid and they were left in a vulnerable position. The 
sub-prime mortgage crisis thus led to global credit crisis when banks began defaulting in 
their payments to each other. This prompted larger banks to restrict their lending to 
smaller banks, building societies, SMEs and individuals as consumers.16  
 
It could be argued that the rating agencies were also to be blamed for the lack of 
transparency. One commentator succinctly explained the rating agencies involvement as 
follows:  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
receivables to raise finance in order to purchase the receivables. The originator/assignor continues to collect 
the receivables on behalf of the assignee. There may be an asset-backed securitisation according to which 
the securities created are backed by pooled assets (e.g. credit card receivables), which are collateralised and 
cannot be sold individually as they are so small or illiquid or mortgage-backed securitisation according to 
which the securities created are backed by mortgage loans, lent to mortgage borrowers (either prime or 
subprime borrowers). On securitisation see e.g. J.J. de Vries Robbe, Securitization Law and Practice in the 
Face of the Credit Crunch Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2008. 
14
 For transparency recommendations and implementation report of International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions‟ (IOSCO) Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products see 
http://www.iosco.org/  and „Unregulated Financial Markets and Products – Final Report‟, Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (September 2009). 
15
 See generally P. Krugman, „How did Economists get it so Wrong?‟ The New York Times September 6, 
2009. 
16
 Arguably the Northern Rock has had difficulties in obtaining funding from larger banks post-subprime 
mortgage crisis due to little money available in the money markets. The BBC Business Editor Robert 
Peston explains this succinctly as follows: “[The Northern Rock was] much more exposed than its rivals to 
this distaste for mortgage debt, because its business is overwhelmingly focused on providing mortgages, 
rather than other kinds of banking business.‟ See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6994160.stm (last 
accessed 12 March 2010) 
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reckless speculation in real estate, overly leveraged financial institutions with too 
little equity capital, the [abusive] securitisation of mortgages and other financial 
instruments with insufficient understanding of the risks involved, and many other 
factors all contributed to the current financial meltdown.17    
 
It can thus be argued that there are two stages in the financial crisis. The first stage is the 
lead up to the credit crisis (i.e. risky lending decisions to people with poor credit 
histories). The second stage is the result of first one which caused financial institutions to 
severely limit their flow of credit, thus unjustly reflecting their fault on the consumers 
and SMEs. In other words, financial institutions are now being extra cautious to the 
detriment of small and medium sized borrowers. Their concerns are understandable; 
however, the crisis has not been caused by consumers or the SMEs. The severe limitation 
of access to credit arguably causes the economy of the UK to shrink.  
 
However, there are certain matters which cause concern on both parties (banks and 
SMEs) to a credit transaction. These include lack of transparency and predictability in 
credit and security law, conservative approach to reform in security interests and lack of 
proper supervision on credit transactions. They, one way or the other, assist vulnerability 
in accessing to affordable credit. 
      
3. DEFINING ‘VULNERABILITY’ WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ACCESS TO 
LOW COST CREDIT 
 
The particular point in vulnerability and access to low cost credit is defining and 
conceptualising the term „vulnerability‟. The term, by itself, is multifaceted and used in 
diverse areas of law such as vulnerability in criminal law or vulnerability in consumer 
                                                 
17
 T. Hurst „The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Worldwide Financial Crisis‟ Company 
Lawyer, 61 (2009), pp. 61-64. Problems with regards to predatory lending and its effect on consumers and 
the role of rating agencies in subprime mortgage crisis see D. Reiss, „Subprime Standardization: How 
Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market‟ 33 Fla. St. U. L. 
Rev. 985 (2006)  
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and contract law.18 Within the context of access to low cost credit, vulnerability may have 
impact on both lenders and borrowers. However, it is arguable that vulnerability may 
have more detrimental results on borrowers, particularly, the SMEs. This latter point 
merits serious consideration.  
 
3.1 Lenders and Borrowers: Vulnerability for All 
 
Within the context of access to low cost credit, the concept of „vulnerability‟ can be 
viewed from two perspectives. Both the lenders and the borrowers are vulnerable to 
credit crisis and both have legitimate concerns. Firstly, lenders have vulnerable positions. 
Since banks borrow from each other (because the interest rate they pay to a bank is 
cheaper than they pay at deposit markets),19 during the credit crisis, it is argued that, they 
have become vulnerable due to restriction on inter-bank loans. Empirical evidence 
illustrated that, prior to the credit crisis, inter-bank loans were generally made to large 
banks and „too-big-to-fail considerations [reduced] the lenders‟ incentives to control for 
borrower‟s risk.‟20 Dinger and von Hagen argue that „...by generating incentives for 
lending banks to monitor interbank-borrowing banks, interbank exposures may also 
contribute to prudent market behaviour and reduce the risk of bank failures and systemic 
distress [as] [t]he idea is that banks are particularly good at identifying the risks of other 
banks.‟21 Lenders do not wish to extend credit which may be risky. The recent credit 
crisis triggered lenders‟ loss of confidence to the market and consumers. Their 
vulnerability can be explained with the volatility of the economic climate. From another 
angle, banks have somewhat lost their privileged position. In the UK, the so-called 
“rescue culture” has resulted in secured creditors‟ entitlements being lost somewhat by 
                                                 
18
 For an interesting and in-depth discussion of vulnerability, mainly from the consumer protection 
perspective see Consumer Affairs Victoria, „Discussion Paper What do we mean by „vulnerable‟ and 
„disadvantaged‟ consumers?‟ (2004). 
19
 See V. Dinger and J. von Hagen, „Does Interbank Borrowing Reduce Bank Risk?‟ Governance and the 
Efficiency of Economic Systems Discussion Paper No. 223, November 2007, at 7. 
20
 See ibid, at 13. 
21
 See ibid, at 2. 
8 
 
recent legislation.22 This includes, for instance, the floating charge holders‟ inability to 
appoint administrative receivers. This has triggered some serious concern to banks as 
they prefer to be in a financially sound position in the event of debtor‟s insolvency. Some 
commentators23 rightly suggested that the modernisation of corporate rescue legislation 
would result in the banks taking fixed charges24 in their lending practices as opposed to 
floating charges in order to strengthen their positions and avoid any vulnerability in the 
event of the debtor‟s insolvency.  
 
Secondly, from the borrowers‟ perspective and particularly for the SMEs affordable 
credit is critical for business expansion.25 Without lending there is a risk that SMEs 
cannot be able to continue expanding their businesses. This will have wider financial 
impact as SMEs constitute a considerable percentage of the British industry.26 Already by 
virtue of poor lending practices and decisions, individuals were able to borrow at 
extremely high percentages without due diligence and this triggered and contributed to 
the collapse or nationalisation of banks. The implications of these extraordinary events 
were felt acutely by SMEs that struggle to access to credit. The critical point in lack of 
access to finance is that inability to borrow reduces economic growth. According to 
empirical studies, clear and predictable rules that enable lenders to extend credit is said to 
                                                 
22
 By virtue of Enterprise Act 2002, Crown preference (listed in Schedule 6 of the Insolvency Act as debts 
due to Inland Revenue, Security contributions and Customs and Excise) is now abolished by the Act 
(s.251) which provides a benefit for floating charge holders because before the Enterprise Act 2002 
preferential debtors in insolvency of the debtor were used to be paid in advance of floating charge holders. 
On the other hand, secured creditors will lose some of their entitlements under s.252 of the Act which is 
inserted as s.176A of the Insolvency Act.  
23
 e.g. V. Finch, „Corporate Rescue in a World of Debt‟ [2008] JBL 756-777, at 766; D. Prentice, 
„Bargaining in the Shadow of the Enterprise Act 2002‟ (2004) 5 E.B.O.R. 153, 158-9.       
24
 However, note that Spectrum Plus Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc [2005] UKHL 41; [2005] 3 
W.L.R. 58; [2005] B.C.C. 694 decision refined those instances where fixed charge may be taken. 
25
 For example, under English law, in order to be able to grant security an entity must have separate legal 
personality, thus ordinary partnerships, which do not have corporate personality, cannot grant security and 
do not have the chance to expand business as compared to private companies or limited liability 
partnerships (LLPs). Doctrine of corporate personality (separate legal personality) is an established concept 
by Salomon v A. Salomon Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22. For a business model and legislative needs argument see 
J. Freedman, „The quest for an ideal form for Small Businesses-A Misconceived Enterprise?‟ in 
Developments in European Company Law Volume 2,  B. Rider and M. Andenas (eds) pp. 5-34 (Kluwer, 
The Hague, 1997) 
26
 See infra note 61 and the accompanying text thereof.  
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positively affect economic growth.27 A number of reasons for reduced lending to SMEs 
have been put forward. These are related to the credit crisis and its consequence on both 
the lenders and borrowers. The credit crisis has weakened the loan portfolios of banks 
which in turn caused banks to be reluctant to lend. This may be coupled with the 
individual problems of SMEs such as relatively low revenue or decreasing values of 
immovable collaterals. As SMEs do not have access to large financing options or cannot 
raise finance in the financial markets, unlike large companies, their credit relationships 
with banks, mainly based on continuous dealings or private information, have been 
negatively affected. Furthermore, concerns with regards to securitisation practices and 
made it for a certain period difficult for SMEs to enter into this type of financing 
patterns.28           
 
It is argued that the main problem is the risky policies of financial institutions which lent 
without the necessary due diligence to borrowers with weak and poor credit histories or 
people who have little or no creditworthiness. In order to overcome the problem of 
confidence to markets, in early 2009, the UK Government has announced that £600 
billion would be injected to banking system in order to encourage banks to lend more into 
the market. The UK Government‟s injection of £37 billion to Royal Bank of Scotland, 
Lloyds TSB and HBOS in return of taking part in the management on how the banks will 
be run and the controls over the bonuses paid to management are critical.29 It is arguable 
that it might be a better option for borrowers to be under the government‟s safety.  
 
                                                 
27
 R. Levine „Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence’ National Bureau of Economic Research, Working 
Paper 10766, at 85 (2004). 
28
 For the causes of reduced lending to small businesses see generally E.A. Duke, „Small Business 
Lending‟ Testimony of Ms. Elizabeth A Duke, member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, before the Committee on Financial Services and Committee on Small Business, US House of 
Representatives, Washington DC, 26 February 2010. 
29 „As a condition of the deal, the government has insisted that senior directors should get no cash bonuses 
this year, with future bonuses to be paid in the form of shares - a move aimed at encouraging management 
to take a more long-term approach.‟ See BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7666570.stm (last 
accessed 22 January 2010) It is arguable that investors have not lost the value of their shares as these banks 
have not been nationalised. The Government will also, as a result of £37 billion recapitalisation of RBS, 
HBOS and Lloyds TSB, through its company UK Financial Investments Ltd. exists in the management of 
these banks. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7706829.stm (last accessed 22 January 2010). 
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3.2 Theoretical Perspectives 
 
From a theoretical perspective, it is argued that the vulnerability of SMEs in access to 
credit is linked to the basic „freedom of contract‟, „bargain theory‟ and the law of secured 
credit. Banks, as secured creditors, on the basis of freedom of contract, take security and 
security is regarded as „a fair exchange for the loan.‟30 In a free market environment, 
freedom of contract is important, particularly, from the perspective of lenders who have 
the right to lend to those enterprises with the necessary collateral power.31 Freedom of 
contract is permitted to the extent there are overriding public policy rules.32 However, 
from a theoretical and contractual point of view, SMEs, just like individual consumers, 
do not have the sufficient bargaining power against banks and financiers. Mostly, lenders 
lend money based on their previous dealings with them or through business intelligence. 
It is arguable that between the SMEs and financiers there is an inequality of bargaining 
power. The „equality in exchange‟ is absent,33 though development of markets and 
possibility to trade future debts have eroded the criticalness of „theories of objective 
value and just price.‟34 The SMEs are too weak to bargain for credit as opposed to banks 
                                                 
30
 G. McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, at 12; for a similar argument see also P. Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 
London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2008, at 250.   
31
 Market order is naturally open to inequality and parties must be able to bargain on their initiative. 
Furthermore, inequality of bargaining power should not be cancelled otherwise, it would undermine the 
regime of contract, which is also the name for market. Unger argued that „[i]f everyone were quickly 
restored to a situation of equality within the market order, the method responsible for this restoration would 
be the true system of resource allocation. It would empty market transactions of much of their apparent 
significance.‟ See R. M. Unger, „The Critical Legal Studies Movement‟ 96 Harvard L. Rev. 561, 625-6 
(1983). 
32
 „Freedom of contract‟ sets the rationale in some cases that deal with floating charges which enables the 
debtor to raise loan capital on debentures. See e.g. Re Brightlife Ltd. [1987] Ch. 200 at 209. There are also 
other decisions that support the freedom of contract in the extension of security e.g. Salomon v A. Salomon 
& Co. [1897] AC 22 at 52; see also McCormack, op cit 30, at 12. 
33
 The need for equality in exchange was particularly the desire of Late Scholastics who detailed rules on 
how contracts should be under certain types of dealings according to which the terms and conditions of a 
contract need to be understood by both parties and a fair price needs to be established in order to address 
this contract as a „just‟ contract.  Loan contracts were among those contracts that attracted the attention of 
late Scholastics. For further detail see e.g. J. Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract 
Doctrine, Oxford: Clarendon Law Series, 1991, 240 et seq.; M.J. Doris, „Did we lose the baby with the 
Bath Water? The Late Scholastic Contribution to the Common Law of Contracts‟ 11 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 
361 (2005).  
34
 For further information see e.g. M.J. Horwitz, „The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law‟ 87 
Harv. L. Rev. 917,946-7 (1974). 
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that are in a stronger position to exhort conditions in a security contract. It is also a 
known fact that small firms can obtain credit mostly on a secured basis, as their financial 
structure pose risk, which requires good credit rating and sufficient acceptable collateral 
as opposed to larger firms that are able to borrow on an unsecured basis.35   
 
Furthermore, SMEs‟ other creditors may be affected by the terms of the security contract. 
This is simply because it is generally accepted that when a grantor (debtor) grants a 
security interest to a secured creditor, other creditors of the grantor will be adversely 
affected as the value of the amount owed to them will be reduced. These are generally 
unsecured creditors or tort claimants who may not adjust the terms of their contracts 
particularly the interest rate they charge a borrower.36    
 
4. SOME POLICY CHOICES TO OVERCOME VULNERABILITY IN ACCESS TO 
LOW COST CREDIT 
 
As mentioned, credit crisis and lack of access to affordable credit have close relationships 
with the concept of vulnerability. The credit crisis has had a negative impact on the flow 
of credit to SMEs. It is arguable that there is negative correlation between improvement 
of financial markets and SMEs‟ access to credit.37  
 
In January 2009 at the World Economic Forum in Davos and in April 2009 during G-20 
Summit in London calls were made to the developed economies to create a „Vulnerability 
Fund‟ to support developing and emerging economies and businesses thereof.38 
Particularly, developed economies were urged to earmark 0.7 per cent of their fiscal 
stimulus packages to support the programmes and efforts of the World Bank and 
Regional Banks. Among these programmes support for SMEs and microfinance 
                                                 
35
 See e.g. Law Commission Report No. 296 (2005), para. 1.2; M.A. Lasfer „Debt Structure, Agency Costs 
and Firm‟s Size: An Empirical Investigation‟ Working Paper Cass Business School, at 18 (2000).  
36
 For further information see McCormack, op cit 30, at 14-5. 
37
 For a similar view see Duke, op cit 28.  
38
 http://go.worldbank.org/76E1GRKBN0 (last accessed 12 March 2010) 
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institutions that lend to the poor have clear significance.39 Support can also be in the form 
of adopting international secured transactions law instruments40 that aim to facilitate 
access to low cost credit and cross border trade as well as modernise domestic laws on 
credit and security. 
 
SMEs are mainly financed through equity financing, trade and bank credits.41 However, 
factoring (outright assignment of receivables) may also be a suitable source of financing 
for the SMEs. One of the most significant advantages of factoring is the fact that 
receivables owed to SME are sold to a factoring company who may pay a discounted 
amount in return, rather than collateralising them (i.e. taking the assets as security to 
satisfy the claims of creditors). If the receivables are collateralised as the title stays with 
the SME, in the case of bankruptcy, they will become part of the bankrupt SME‟s estate, 
which means that their credit risk stays with the SME. Consequently, this is a significant 
element in the decision of credit supplied by the factoring company which is based on the 
value of the SMEs receivable rather than SMEs creditworthiness.42 
 
In Europe, 99 per cent of businesses are SMEs.43 An SME is defined as an enterprise 
which employs less than 250 employees and has a maximum turnover of €50 million or 
an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million.44 The new definition of SMEs45 
                                                 
39
 See http://comment.fco.gov.uk/roller2/debate/entry/protection_for_the_most_vulnerable1 (last accessed 
30 January 2010). 
40
 Such as the UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade and the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions. 
41
 See generally J. Bartholdy and C. Mateus, „Financing of SMEs: an Asset Side Story‟ (2008) available at 
http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Reno/Papers/sme-an-asset-side-story.pdf (last accessed October 2011) 
42
 For the significance of factoring see generally L. Klapper, „The Role of Factoring for Financing Small 
and Medium Enterprises‟ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3593 (2005).  
43
 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1003 (last accessed 22 January 2010). 
Also for the importance of SMEs in the EU economy see European Commission Enterprise and Industry 
Directorate-General Report of the Expert Group Think Small First-Considering SME interests in policy-
making including the application of an “SME Test” March 2009, at 4. 
44
 Extract of Article 2 of the Annex of Recommendation 2003/361EC; for the introduction of new 
definition of SMEs see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/sme_definition/sme_user_guide.pdf 
(last accessed 22 January 2010). 
45
 See op cit 44. 
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aims to improve access to credit by virtue of facilitation of equity financing46 (raising 
finance through sale of stock to investors) in order to overcome difficulties faced with 
debt financing. The EU Commission observes that vulnerability of SMEs in relation to 
their equity position is coupled with the late payment problems.47 However, restrictions in 
access to credit are faced in the early stages of the constitution of SMEs. Restrictions in 
access to finance through debt financing (raising finance through borrowing money) pose 
serious problems. One of the reasons for difficulties in access to credit is related to the 
contractual conditions of financiers who subject the extension of credit to guarantees or 
collateral which SMEs may not readily and sufficiently have at the time of their 
inception.48  
 
The SMEs also have a vulnerable equity position.49 The EU Commission, within the 
framework of „Think Small First‟ approach, has adopted in June 2008 a „Small Business 
Act‟ for Europe.50 This is, in fact, an initiative which sets out 10 principles that will guide 
implementation of policies throughout the EU and in individual Member States that will 
tackle with the problems that restrict the growth of SMEs.51 One of the principles 
particularly aims to „facilitate SMEs‟ access to finance and develop a legal and business 
environment supportive to timely payment in commercial transactions.‟52 Risks involved 
                                                 
46
 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/sme_definition/sme_user_guide.pdf (last accessed 22 
January 2010), at 9. It is suggested by the EU that equity financing will assist SMEs to raise finance „by 
granting favourable treatment to certain investors, such as regional funds, venture capital companies and 
business angels without the enterprise losing its SME status.‟  
47
 According to the EU Commission‟s observation „SMEs have to wait between 20 and over 100 days on 
average to get their invoices paid. One out of four insolvencies is due to late payment. This leads to the loss 
of 450.000 jobs and of €25 billion every year.‟ See infra note 49, at 11. In order to tackle with the problem 
of late payment Late Payment of Commercial Debts Regulations 2002 was adopted to amend and 
supplement the Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interests) Act 1998. Furthermore, the Department for 
Business, Innovations and Skills introduced a Prompt Payment Code for business which encourages 
businesses to pay suppliers on time and provides clear guidance on payment procedures to suppliers. For 
further information see http://www.promptpaymentcode.org.uk/ (last accessed 12 February 2010). 
48
 It is important to note that in the UK, according to the figures of Federation of Small Businesses, every 
year at least 500.000 start up their own business. It can be argued that this is a significant number who may 
wish access to credit and failure to do so may affect the economy as a whole. 
49
 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Think Small First” A “Small Business Act” for Europe 
{SEC (2008) 2101}, {SEC (2008) 2102}, Brussels, 25.6. 2008, COM (2008) 394 final, at 11. 
50
 See generally ibid. 
51
 ibid, at 3. 
52
 ibid, at 4. 
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in financial crises times deter investors and financiers to invest or extend credit to SMEs. 
This has detrimental effect in the early stages of SMEs. The EU Commission has 
observed that „[p]ossible market failures in SME finance provision must be identified and 
corrected to further develop the European risk capital markets, to improve SMEs‟ access 
to micro-credit and mezzanine finance and to develop new products and services.‟53 
Similar observation is also made by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). The 
SME Council of the CBI has focused on encouraging government to address market 
failures and called for the government to provide solutions for the £250,000 to £3million 
equity gap facing SMEs seeking necessary capital for growth and requested the cost54 of 
raising equity finance deductible for corporation tax purposes.55    
 
One possibility to reduce the vulnerability, particularly, in the face of financial crisis is 
the proposal of the European Investment Bank (EIB) according to which a certain amount 
of funds is to be directed to SMEs which will be mitigating their loss.56 This may assist 
SMEs in accessing low-cost credit. Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) is „[a] 
government loan guarantee scheme, delivered via participating Lenders and aimed at 
supporting the availability of working capital and investment funding for small and 
medium sized businesses in the UK.‟57 The scheme also provides security to SMEs if 
Lenders require early repayment of loans. The particular impact of the scheme is its 
facilitation of lending and thus access to credit „by providing lenders with a Government 
backed guarantee for 75 per cent of the loan value‟.58 The significance of this support is 
two folds. Firstly, it is argued that the lender is provided with a governmental guarantee 
                                                 
53
 ibid, at 11. 
54
 This amount is approximately £20 million. http://www.cbi.org.uk/ Confederation of British Industry 
SME Council priorities (last accessed 27 February 2010). 
55
 See http://www.cbi.org.uk/ Confederation of British Industry SME Council priorities (last accessed 27 
February 2010).   
56
 For a similar argument http://www.fsb.org.uk/ Federation of Small Business-European Investment Bank 
Proposition (last accessed 23 November 2009). 
57
 http://www.fsb.org.uk/policy/assets/efg.pdf (last accessed 27 February 2010). For the list of participating 
lenders see http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/enterprise/finance/efg/page50162.html. Small businesses in 
their Principles of Small Business Banking requested that all banks dealing with small businesses should 
apply for European Investment Bank Credit, along with the Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme. See 
http://www.fsb.org.uk/documents/bankingprinciples/ (last accessed 25 November 2009). 
58
 http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/enterprise/finance/efg/page37607.html (last accessed 27 February 
2010) 
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which aims to increase confidence that in cases of default, the Government assurance will 
be there. Secondly, this support aims to facilitate the borrower‟s access to low-cost credit 
which would not otherwise take place. However, recently it has become clear that banks 
are restricting loans to SMEs and not meeting the commitment under the government‟s 
Enterprise Finance scheme.59 From another perspective, some economists suggest that 
despite the fact that SMEs cannot access to debt financing market due to lack of collateral 
required by banks, they can still mitigate their loss and improve their borrowing capacity 
by joining mutual guarantee institutions according to which the SMEs relatively pay less 
for credit.60  
 
In the UK, the Small and Medium Sized Business Federation‟s statistics clearly prove 
that SMEs are most vulnerable to credit crisis. In the UK, there are 4.7 million SMEs 
with 13.5 million employees and their contribution to UK economy is more than half of 
turnover.61 Furthermore, the SMEs in the UK suffer from unexpected changes of interest 
rates for loans and overdrafts, lack of access to credit despite good credit histories, 
differences of approach of banks in relation to access to credit, high facility fees and 
reverse on promised finance.62 Whilst this is the case in a developed economy such as the 
UK63, in emerging markets such as the Latin American economies businesses have 
similar problems and they pay higher interest rates for loans with short maturities than 
their counterparts for instance in the USA who pay lower interest rates for loans with 
longer maturities.64 
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 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8517789.stm (last accessed 16 February 2010); see also 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8505456.stm (last accessed 16 February 2010); 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2010/02/the_acute_vulnerability_of_the.html (last 
accessed 16 February 2010). 
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 See generally F. Columba, L. Gambacorta and P.E.Mistrulli, „Mutual Guarantee Institutions and Small 
Business Finance‟ Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Working Papers No. 290, October 2009. 
61
 http://www.fsb.org.uk/ Report on Number Crunching the Credit Crunch (last accessed 22 November 
2009) 
62
 see ibid. 
63
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http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (last accessed 22 November  
2009) 
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 See e.g. H. Fleisig and N. de la Pena „Microenterprises and Collateral‟ CEAL Issue Brief No. 2 (2002); H. 
Fleisig and N. De la Pena „Peru: How Problems in the Framework doe Secured Transactions Limit Access 
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A supplementary approach to the EU‟s principles that aim to facilitate the SMEs‟ access 
to finance may be suggested. Structural and legislative changes aimed at the growth and 
increasing the innovative potential of SMEs within the European context can be 
supplemented by the innovative aspects of international instruments that aim to 
modernise the law of credit and security globally. 
 
The UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables was prepared for the purposes of 
establishing a model for the modernisation of domestic assignment law and as a first 
substantive step towards the overall harmonisation of the law of assignment of 
receivables in international trade.65 The key objective of the Convention is to facilitate the 
cross-border flow of credit and to lower the cost of credit through harmonisation of rules 
that govern assignments which will lead to greater predictability and certainty in the 
assignment of receivables contracts. 
 
The UNCITRAL Guide on Secured Transactions targets the modernisation of emerging 
markets‟ secured transactions legislations in which inefficient rules often prevent 
facilitation of secured credit as well as developed nations with inefficient secured credit 
laws and those with relatively efficient secured transactions regimes. Modernisation 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Firm‟s Size: An Empirical Investigation‟ Working Paper Cass Business School (2000), at 14. The 
empirical studies show that 68 per cent of small companies‟ debt is short-term. Only 32 per cent is payable 
in more than one year, while 64 per cent of the larger companies‟ debt is long-term. 
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Assignment of Receivables in International Trade 27 et seq. New York: United Nations Publications, 2004. 
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Comp. L. 275 (2003); S. Bazinas, „An International Legal Regime For Receivables Financing: 
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through adoption and implementation of the recommendations will eventually, in theory, 
lead to harmonisation of secured transactions regimes. For the facilitation of credit the 
Guide suggests that „secured transactions laws should be structured to enable businesses 
to maximize the extent to which they can utilize the value inherent in their movable 
assets to obtain credit.‟66 This is certainly crucial because in times of financial crisis 
individuals as well as businesses have no or very limited access to finance as financial 
institutions are reluctant to lend, possibly because of the insufficiency of protection 
provided by archaic property laws which often do not recognise anything but immovable 
and not very often, movable property as collateral. The Guide reflects clear and 
predictable rules as well as the practical truth that secured lending reduces the risk of 
non-payment and lowers the cost of credit. The Guide adopts a comprehensive and 
functional approach to security in order to facilitate credit according to which grantor 
should be able to use all of the assets and obligations and all security transactions serve 
the same economic purposes should be treated alike. It is argued that particularly these 
two significant instruments have the characteristics and effectiveness to enable SMEs to 
access to low cost credit and prevent their susceptibility to loss. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
SMEs have vulnerable position as against financiers. Credit crisis has increased their 
vulnerability, since access to credit has been understandably more restrictive. Under the 
freedom of contract perspective financiers may choose debtors, however, in the case of 
SMEs, particularly those of which are in the start up process, lack of necessary collateral 
prevents them to access to vital credit. Even when SMEs have the necessary collateral 
due to financiers‟ loss of confidence to markets, access to credit does not seem to be 
possible. Although there are EU wide measures to reduce the vulnerable position of 
SMEs and within the UK the government‟s Enterprise Guarantee scheme to increase 
lending to small businesses, these measures must be fully implemented. Another option 
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 Guide, para. 8, at 2. 
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to reduce vulnerability in accessing credit may be to adopt and implement international 
instruments on the law of credit and security aiming to modernise the law and increase 
access to low cost credit. 
